NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE- TEACHING
OF SCIENCE OF CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE/TRANSCENDENTAL
MEDITATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS VIOLATES ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE OF FIRST AMENDMENT-Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197

(3d Cir. 1979).
During the 1975-76 school year, five public high schools in New
Jersey offered an elective course in the Science of Creative Intelligence and its technique of transcendental meditation (SCI/TM). 1
The methods and materials used in the five schools were the same,
and the course instructors were employees of World Plan Executive
Council-US (WPEC-US).2 Classes were held four or five days a

week at each of the schools. 3 While roughly thirty percent of each
class period was devoted to instruction in and practice of the
technique of transcendental meditation, the bulk of time spent by the
high school students with the WPEC-US teachers was reserved for
instruction in the underlying theory of the Science of Creative Intelligence, 4 for which purpose a uniform textbook was used. 5 The
major portion of the textbook described, in detail, the qualities of

Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 198 (3d Cir. 1979).
Its adherents have described transcendental meditation as
[n]either a religion or a philosophy, nor a way of life, [but] a natural technique for
reducing stress and expanding conscious awareness. It was first introduced into the
United States in 1959 by the Indian teacher Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. The term
"transcendental" means "going beyond."
H. BLOOMFIELD, M. CAIN & D. JAFFE, TM: DISCOVERING INNER ENERGY AND OVERCOMING
STRESS 10 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as BLOOMFIELD].
The technique requires the meditator to contemplate his mantra, or sound aid, see note 7
infra and accompanying text, which causes his mind to travel backward through the development of thought until it reaches the source of all thought, "the field of pure creative intelligence." This process and the qualities of creative intelligence are explained by the theory of the
Science of Creative Intelligence. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1288-89 (D.N.J. 1977),
aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979). See also notes 60-69 infra and accompanying text.
2 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979). WPEC-US is a nonprofit organization which sponsors the teaching of SCIITM throughout the United States. Id. at 1287. As employees of WPEC-US, the teachers were not paid by
any of the five school boards involved, and had not been certified by the State Board of
Examiners. Id. at 1289. The programs were, however, supported by approximately $40,000 in
Department of Health, Education and Welfare funds. Note, TranscendentalMeditation and the
Meaning of Religion Under the Establishment Clause, 62 MINN. L. REV. 887, 888 n.7 (1978).
HEW was among the 20 named defendants in Malnak, 440 F. Supp. at 1288.
s Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 198 (3d Cir. 1979).
, Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1323 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979).
5 Id. at 1289. The textbook was titled Science of Creative Intelligence for Secondary Education: First Year Course. Id, at n.6.
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creative intelligence. 6 Each student who had chosen to participate in
the SCI/TM course was required to attend a special ceremony in
order to receive his or her own personal mantra, or thought-sound,
which is considered by SCI/TM adherents to be indispensable to the
practice of proper meditation technique. 7 These ceremonies, called
pujas, were held away from school property on Sundays and were
performed privately for each student by his or her instructor. 8
A group of twelve plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the teaching of
SCI/TM in New Jersey's public schools. 9 They alleged that the
course, as taught, conflicted with the establishment clauses of both
the state and federal constitutions. 10 The United States District
6 Id. at 1323. These qualities, as described by the textbook, were found by the court to be
religious in nature. See notes 60-69 infra and accompanying text.
7 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1305 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979). The Sanskrit term "mantra" means " 'a thought the effects of which are known . . . [although] mantras taught for use in TM have no denotative meaning.'" BLOOMFIELD, supra note 1,
at 17-18. Individual mantras are never to be revealed once the student has learned the
technique of using the mantra from his instructor. Id at 18.
Each student who participated in the New Jersey programs promised in writing to keep his
mantra a secret. 440 F. Supp. at 1305.
1 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1305 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979).
Each student was required to bring a clean white handkerchief, some flowers, and several
pieces of fruit to his puja, and to remove his shoes upon entering the room in which the
ceremony was to be held. After lighting a candle and incense, the teacher sang a Sanskrit chant
for three or four minutes and then gave the student his mantra. This ceremony was performed
before an eight by twelve inch photograph of Guru Dev, a teacher of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi,.
who had been dead for over two decades. Id. For an English translation of a portion of the
chant see note 71 infra.
The district court and the court of appeals accorded these facts great weight in determining
the religious nature of the SCI/TM course. See text accompanying notes 72-75 infra.
9 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979). Among the twelve plaintiffs were eight federal, state, and local taxpayers who had formed
an unincorporated association called the Coalition for Religious Integrity. Four of these taxpayers were also parents of students at one of the schools offering the SCIITM course. The
remaining plaintiffs included a clergyman residing in New Jersey and two nonprofit, out-of-state
corporations, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and, Spiritual Counterfeit
Project, Inc. Id.
The twenty named defendants included the WPEC-US, its president, and a teacher and
a project director of SCIITM. Brief for Appellants at 1, Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979). Other defendants were the five boards of education responsible for the high schools
involved in the SCI/TM program; the State of New Jersey and its Board, Department, and
Commission of Education; the United States; and the United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (see note 2 supra). 440 F. Supp. at 1288. Because of his absence froifi
the country, plaintiffs were unable to effect service of process on Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, the
founder of the SCI/TM movement. Id. at 1288 n.7.
10 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1312 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.
1979). The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Court for the District of New Jersey, in Malnak v. Yogi," found that
the teaching of the SCI/TM course was a religious activity for first
amendment purposes, and was in violation of the establishment
clause of the United States Constitution' 2 despite the assertions of
defendants that SCI/TM was a science and not a religion. 13 Judge
Meanor, in a lengthy and highly detailed opinion, granted plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment and enjoined the teaching of
the course in the public schools of New Jersey. 14 Defendants then
brought a motion under rule 60(b)'15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, requesting relief from the judgment, claiming that the
district court had made incorrect determinations of fact in granting
17
summary judgment. 16 The motion was denied.
Several individual defendants and WPEC-US appealed.' 8 In a
per curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in Malnak v. Yogi,1 9 affirmed the judgment of the district
court "essentially for the reasons set forth by Judge H. Curtis
Meanor"20 in the court below. 2 1 The circuit court echoed Judge
Meanor's findings that the textbook and the puja constituted religious
activity 22 and that this determination was dispositive of the case,
since the involvement of governmental entities in the dissemination
23
of SCI/TM was undisputed.
The constitution of the State of New Jersey declares that "[there shall be no establishment
of one religious sect in preference to another." N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 4. The plaintiffs' claim
under the New Jersey Constitution was never ruled upon since the finding of a violation of the
Federal Constitution's establishment clause rendered consideration of the lesser claim unnecessary. 440 F. Supp. at 1324 n.27.
11 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
12 Id. at 1324.
's Brief for Appellants, supra note 9, at 21. Defendants distinguished SCIFI'M from a religion by asserting that the underlying theories were based on testable evidence and reason, rather
than on faith. They further noted that the habitual practice of TM would result in beneficial
physiological and psychological effects whether or not the meditator accepted the theoretical
aspects of SC. Id. at 33-34.
14 440 F. Supp. at 1327.
5 Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part: "the court nay relieve a party ... from a final
judgment ... for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable ne-

glect; . . . (b) any other reason justifying relief .

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

11 Brief for Appellants, supra note 9, at 68.
17 See id.
18 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 198 (3d Cir. 1979).

19 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
20 Id.

at 198.

21 Id. at 199. Because of the abbreviated nature of per curiam decisions and the circuit
court's articulated agreement with the reasoning of Judge Meanor's opinion, the primary focus
of this note will be a discussion of the lower court's decision.
22 Id.

23 Id.; see 440 F. Supp. at 1323.
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In the first Supreme Court decision to directly interpret the
establishment clause of the first amendment, Everson v. Board of
Education,24 the Court considered a plan whereby a local board of
education reimbursed parents for part of the cost of transporting their
children to parochial schools. 2 5 The plan in question had been designed pursuant to a New Jersey statute which authorized school
boards to provide transportation to nonpublic school students. 26 In
27
upholding the legality of the plan under the establishment clause,
the Supreme Court articulated the role of government in its connections with religious groups to be one of neutrality rather than hostility.

28

In the years following Everson, establishment clause cases argued before the Supreme Court resulted in the evolution of a threepronged test which government action must pass when challenged as
fostering an establishment of religion. The three requirements, which
29
first appeared as elements of a single test in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
mandate that the legislative purpose of the law must be distinctly
secular, its "primary effect must ... neither advance nor inhibit religion," 30 and it must avoid " 'excessive government entanglement
24

330 U.S. 1. Prior to Everson, the Supreme Court dealt generally with both religion

clauses of the first amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108
(1943).
The establishment clause was treated independently by the Court for the first time in
Everson. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 702 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
25 330 U.S. at 3. The Board of Education was a governmental entity of the Township of

Ewing, New Jersey.
2I Id. at 3 & n.1. The statute upon which the reimbursement plan was based provided:
Whenever in any district there are children living remote from any schoolhouse,
the board of education of the district may make rules and contracts for the transportation of such children to and from school, including the transportation of school
children to and from school other than a public school, except such school as is
operated for profit in whole or in part.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 18:14-8 (Cum. Supp. 1941), codified in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:39-1 (West

Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); 330 U.S. at 3 n.1.
27 330 U.S. at 18. The benefit to parochial schools was found to be analogous to benefits
derived from public provision of such services as police, fire and sewerage to religious schools.
It was therefore separate from any religious function. Id. at 17-18.
28 Id. at 18. Writing for the Court, Justice Black wrote: "[The First] Amendment requires
the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary." Id. In his dissent, Justice Rutledge took a
much narrower view. He suggested that a violation of separation of church and state would be
worked by any use of tax moneys which resulted in help to religious activities. Id. at 52 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 820 & n.5 (1978).
29 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
30 Id. at 612. The first two prongs were initially articulated by Justice Clark writing for the
majority in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). The Schempp Court invalidated,
as a violation of the establishment clause, a Pennsylvania law requiring that ten verses of the
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with religion.' "31 The Court reaffirmed the need for laws challenged
under the establishment clause to meet all three prongs of this test in
32
its 1973 decision in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.
There the Court struck down a New York statute that gave financial
aid to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools without ensuring
that the funds were to be used only for secular purposes. 33 The
possibility that some of the funds could be used to support religious
of religion, was
education, resulting in impermissible advancement 34
statute.
the
invalidate
to
Court
enough to cause the
If the developed standards for judging constitutional challenges on
establishment clause grounds are clear, judicial efforts to arrive at a
concrete definition of the word religion itself are far less so. 35 In
1890, the Supreme Court in Davis v. Beason 36 pronounced a theistic
view of the meaning of religion, stressing a belief in God. 37

This

Bible be read without comment at the start of each school day. The statute was unconstitutional
despite a provision allowing a child who presented a written request from a parent or guardian
to be excused from the service. Id. at 205.
31 403 U.S. at 613. This analysis first appeared in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 377 U.S. 664, 674
(1970).
For a more detailed discussion of the development of the three-pronged test, see Note,
Religious Groups' Use of Public School Buildings During Nonschool Hours Not Violative of
Establishment Clause of First Amendment, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 524, 528-42 (1978).
32 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
3 Id. at 774. Speaking through Justice Powell, the Court invalidated the statute because of
its failure " 'to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and
to ensure that State financial aid supports only the former.' " Id. at 783 (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
34 413 U.S. at 790-91.
31 In the district court opinion in Malnak, Judge Meanor wrote, "[o]wing to the variety of
form and substance which religions may take, the courts have avoided the establishment of
explicit criteria, the possession of which indelibly identifies an activity as religious for purposes
of the first amendment." 440 F. Supp. at 1312.
While this may have been so in establishment clause cases, courts have consistently addressed the meaning of the term in free exercise and conscientious objector cases, particularly
during the last twenty years. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 200 (Adams, J., concurring in the
result).
36 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (holding that Mormon belief in polygamy was not religious tenet as
people generally view religion, and that while free exercise clause protects belief it does not
necessarily protect actions taken pursuant to that belief).
37 Id. at 342. The Beason Court declared that "'[t]he term 'religion' has reference to one's
views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his
being and character, and of obedience to his will." Id.
This early position by the Court appears to have been grounded in the views expressed by
the framers of the Constitution. See, e.g., J. MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance on the
Religious Rights of Man, in CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 84 (J. Blau
ed. 1964). Religion is "the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging
it." Id.
For a thorough examination of efforts to fix a meaning for the word religion in the context
of the first amendment, see Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1056 (1978).
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view prevailed 3S until 1943 when the Court of Appeals for the Seeond Circuit, in United States v. Kauten, 3 9 began to broaden the traditional definition. Speaking through Judge Augustus Hand, the court
indicated that the religious nature of a set of ideas did not necessarily
require belief in a Supreme Being, but could embrace the imperatives of conscience which represent for some what have historically
been considered religious notions. 40
The Supreme Court reinforced the shift in focus initiated by the
Second Circuit in Kauten eighteen years later in Torcaso v. Watkins. 4 1 In that case, the Court unanimously invalidated a requirement under the Maryland Constitution that made a declaration of belief in God a prerequisite to the holding of public office in that
state. 4 2 In its opinion the Court rested on both free exercise and
establishment grounds, holding that the state may neither favor theistic over nontheistic faiths, nor prevent an individual from holding
public office because of his beliefs. 43 The Torcaso Court clearly intended to widen the constitutional definition of religion to encompass
views which are not centered on a belief in the existence of a Supreme Being when it declared that "neither [state nor federal government] can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." 44
On the heels of Torcaso came the school prayer case of Engel v.
Vitale. 45 In Engel, the Supreme Court held that the daily recitation
38 In 1931, Chief Justice Hughes wrote that "[t]he essence of religion is belief
in a relation
to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.'" United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
39 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
40 Id. at 708. Contra, Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329

U.S. 795 (1946). Judge Hand wrote:
[C]onscientious objection to participation in any war . . . may justly be regarded as
a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is
for many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has always been
thought a religious impulse.
133 F.2d at 708.
At least two commentators have remarked that this statement by Judge Hand was dictum,
since the result of the Kauten decision was to deny conscientious objector status to an atheist
whose petition was based on political grounds alone. See Comment, Teaching Transcendental
Meditation in Public Schools: Defining Religion for Establishment Purposes, 16 SAN DIErO L.
REV. 325, 337 (1979); Note, supra note 37, at 1061 n.35.
41 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
42 Id. at 495. The contested portion of the Maryland Constitution had operated
to deny
appellant, a Secular Humanist, an appointment as a notary public because of his refusal to take
the required oath. Id. at 489.
43 Id. at 494-95.
41 Id. at 495. See 440 F. Supp. at 1313. The Torcaso Court named several religions which
are not founded upon a belief in God, including Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism. 367 U.S. at 495 n.1l.
45 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:614

by public schoolchildren of a nondenominational prayer prepared by
the New York State Board of Regents was in violation of the establishment clause. 4 6 The court declared that an activity may be of a
religious nature, although it is not connected to any established re47
ligious group, if "[i]t is a solemn avowal of divine faith."
The abandonment of a purely theistic approach to defining religion, which had begun in the Kauten and Torcaso decisions, was given
49
emphasis in United States v. Seeger 4 s and Welsh v. United States.
Both Seeger and Welsh involved judicial construction of section 6(j) of
the Universal Military Service and Training Act of 1948.50 Under
this provision an applicant for conscientious objector status was re-

46 Id. at 424. The prayer read:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.
Id. at 422.
While recitation of the prayer was theoretically voluntary, students who wished to be excused needed a written request from a parent or guardian and were subject to peer pressure if
they left the room where the prayer was being said. Id. at 423.
A number of school prayers were subsequently invalidated by lower federal courts,
rendering such activities virtually impossible. See, e.g., Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965); Goodwin v. Cross Country School Dist. No. 7, 394 F.
Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973); ACLU v. Gallatin Area School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa.
1969).
Notable among these was DeSpain v. DeKalb Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968), in which a grace repeated by kindergarteners
before their daily snack was found to be a religious activity. The lines recited were:
We thank you for the flowers so sweet;
We thank you for the food we eat;
We thank you for the birds that sing;
We thank you for everything.
Id. at 837.
The Seventh Circuit found "the ...
'secular purposes' of the verse were . . . supplemental
to its basic and primary purpose, which was the religious act of praising and thanking the
Deity." Id. at 839. In concurring in the Third Circuit opinion in Malnak, Judge Adams
suggested that the DeSpain decision, like the Malnak decision, could be construed as having
found an activity to be religious despite assertions of secularity by its proponents. 592 F.2d at
202-03 & n.13. (Adams, J., concurring in the result). See generally Sutherlahrd, Establishment
According to Engel, 76 HAJV. L. REv. 25 (1962).
47 370 U.S. at 424.
In another school prayer case decided one year alter Engel, the Supreme Court struck
down a Pennsylvania statute requiring the reading of 10 Bible verses without comment at the
beginning of each school day. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). As in Engel,
participation was voluntary in form, but fears of peer pressure prevented children, including the
Schempp children, from asking to be excused. Id. at 208 n.3. See note 46 supra. But see 374
U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
48 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
49 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
5o Ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (currently found at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1970)).
Although the decision in Seeger turned on statutory construction, its implications in the de-
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quired to show that his opposition to war was based upon "religious
training and belief," 5 1 which was defined in the provision as "an in52
dividual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being."
In Seeger, the Supreme Court bent the meaning of these terms
to give a much broader reach to the term religion than the legislature
had apparently intended. In interpreting section 6(j), the Court
created an objective approach to the evaluation of claimed beliefs,
and declared that religion could include ideas which "occupy the
same place in [the applicant's] life as the belief in a traditional deity
holds in the lives" of followers of theistic faiths. 53 The Seeger Court
indicated, however, that even under this broader definition of religion, individuals whose objections were "political, sociological or
54
economic" would not be within the scope of the exemption.
Speaking through Justice Black, the Court in Welsh extended the
Seeger interpretation of section 6(j). It held that the exemption for
reasons of "religious training and belief" was broad enough to encompass moral and ethical principles. 5 5 This statement of the exemption's sweep represented a significant expansion of the Seeger Court's
position that objections based on "political, sociological or economic"

velopment of a constitutional standard for religion have been recognized by several commentators. See, e.g., Clancey & Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems in Conceptual Clarity and Constitutional Considerations, 17 ME. L. REV. 143, 145 (1965); MANSFIELD,
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION-1964 TERM, IN 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3,

8-9

(D. Gianella ed., 1966).
51 Ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (currently found at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1970)).
52 Id. Section 6(j), at the time Seeger and Welsh were decided, provided in pertinent part:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
Id.
53 380 U.S. at 187.
The Court stated "[w]here such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' and the other is not."
Id. at 166. Justice Clark, writing for the Court, defined such "a power or being, or . . . faith [as
that] to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." Id. at 176.
Seeger, who would not declare faith in a Supreme Being, nevertheless was granted conscientious objector status on the basis of his affirmation of " 'a religious faith in a purely ethical
creed.' " Id. at 166.
Notwithstanding the Seeger Court's characterization of its test as an "essentially objective
one," id. at 184, it becomes substantially subjective when applied, in that it seeks to assess the
position occupied in an individual's life by a particular set of ideas. See Comment, supra note
40, at 339; Note, supra note 2, at 897-98.
54 380 U.S. at 173.
55 398 U.S. at 342-43. The only qualification of the Court's holding was its statement that
objections based "solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency" would not
justify an exemption under the statute. Id.
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grounds were insufficient to qualify an applicant for conscientious ob56
jector status.
The Malnak decision has added to the judicial trend which
broadened the meaning of religion in free exercise and conscientious
objector cases, by including for the first time within that meaning a
series of activities which the practitioners insisted were secular in nature. 57 More importantly, the Third Circuit has increased the scope
of the meaning of religion developed in other contexts by using it to
strike down a state-supported program on establishment clause
grounds. 5 8
The reasoning of the district court, which the court of appeals
enthusiastically adopted, began with a detailed analysis of the
textbook used in the SCI/TM course. 5 9 The major portion of the text
consisted of elaborate descriptions of the qualities of creative intelligence. 60 These descriptions declared that, as the source of all things,
"creative intelligence 'is the home of all qualities that we can conceive of in the fields of knowledge and action, existence and evolution.' "61 Creative intelligence was described, inter alia,6 2 as " 'the
basis of life,' "63 " 'the impelling life force,' "P " 'always acting, ever
vigilant,' -65 " 'omnipoten[t]' "66 and " 'omniscient.' "67 Judge
Meanor found that, despite the assertions of the defendants that the
statements in the textbook were not meant to be religious, the language of the textbook itself contradicted such protestations. 68 He

56 380 U.S. at 173. One commentator has characterized the narrowing of the categories of
exemption in Welsh as "the final step in a remarkable feat of linguistic transmutation." Note,
supra note 37, at 1065 n.60.
The author concluded that this line of reasoning transformed Congress' original intent (to
exclude from exemption all applicants whose beliefs were based on other than theistic grounds)
into an interpretation excluding only those based on " 'policy, pragmatism, or expediency.' " id.
(quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970)).
:7 592 F.2d at 200 (Adams, J., concurring in the result). See also Brief for Appellants, supra
note 9, at 21-33.
58 592 F.2d at 200 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
59 440 F. Supp. at 1289. See note 5 supra.
60 440 F. Supp. at 1323.
61 Id.
62

at 1291.

Id. at 1289-1305. Judge Meanor's examination of the text contained numerous quotations.

Id. Those
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.

given here are by way of example.
at 1292.
Creative intelligence is "at the core of everything in the universe." Id.
at 1293.
at 1294.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 1297. In support of this finding, Judge Meanor cited the following quotation from
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reasoned that the extraordinary characteristics attributed to creative
to those which are usually
intelligence by the textbook were parallel
69
ascribed to a deity or ultimate reality.
In an equally thorough textual analysis of the puja, the district
court compared the language of the puja to that of invalidated school
prayers 70 and found the Sanskrit chant, 7 1 which was sung by a
teacher in the presence of a single student, to be religious in nature. 72 The chant made clear expressions of reverence, such as " 'the
Lord,' " and " 'our master' " in its supplications to Guru Dev, the
teacher of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. 73 These and other divine characterizations attributed qualities to Guru Dev which the district court
felt would never be used to describe a human being. 74 The defendants urged that the puja was merely a formalized expression of
gratitude, but the district court dealt harshly with this contention.
Judge Meanor wrote that "[o]ne would no more perform a ceremony
of gratitude to a tradition or to a body of knowledge than one would
perform a ceremony of gratitude to a chair... "75
In its discussion of SCI/TM as a religion for first amendment
purposes, the district court declined to fashion an explicit definition
the textbook: " Creative intelligence is not just an abstract concept or idea; it is a concrete
reality that can be practically applied to bring success and fulfillment to every phase of living.'"
Id.
69 Id. at 1300, 1323.

70 Id. at 1310, 1313-15.
71 The English translation of the chant included the following:
"Invocation
Whether pure or impure, where purity or impurity is permeating everywhere,
whoever opens himself to the expanded vision of unbounded awareness gains inner
and outer purity.
Offering
Offering
Offering
Offering
Offering

the invocation of the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
a seat to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
an ablution to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
a cloth to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Sandalpaste to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.

Guru Dev, Shri Brahmananda, bliss of the Absolute, transcendental joy, the SelfSufficient, the embodiment of pure knowledge which is beyond and above the universe like the sky, the aim of 'Thou art that' and other such expressions which
unfold eternal truth, the One, the Eternal, the Pure, the Immovable, the Witness
of all intellects, whose status transcends thought, the transcendent along with the
three gunas, the true preceptor, to Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Id. at 1306-07.
72 Id. at 1309.
71 Id. at 1307. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
7' 440 F. Supp. at 1308. The terms used to describe Guru Dev included "'the embodiment
of pure knowledge which is beyond and above the universe like the sky.' " Id.
75 Id. at 1309.
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of religion. Rather, the court determined that a decision in Malnak
could be extrapolated from the kinds of activities that had been found
to be religio us in prior Supreme Court decisions. 76 The district
court refused to accept the " 'substantive and contextual' " approach
to defining religion under the first amendment advocated by the defendants, 77 since the outcome of such an inquiry would depend heavily upon an individual's subjective feelings about the nature of the
activities, thereby making a uniform first amendment standard impos78
sible.
Judge Meanor recalled that the use of subjective characterizations had been found burdensome in Welsh where, although Welsh
himself had declared that his petition for conscientious objector status
did not stem from religious convictions, the Supreme Court had herd
that his deep feelings against participating in wars were religious for
section 6(j) purposes. 7 9 Furthermore, " 'the Court's statement in
[United States v.] Seeger that a registrant's characterization of his
own belief as "religious" should cany great weight does not imply
that his declaration that his views are nonreligious should be treated
similarly.' "80
The district court in Malnak found the decisions in Welsh and
Seeger to be significant, not because of their struggle with the problem of defining religion, but because the Supreme Court in both

76 Id. at 1312, 1320. The court analogized the lack of an explicit constitutional definition of
religion in prior cases to the lack of any such definition for speech or press for first amendment
purposes. The meaning of such terms changes with time and national growth. Id. at 1315. See
also Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604
(1964). The court recognized that prior religion cases had dealt only with activities which the
proponents had agreed were religious, whereas in Malnak the defendants claimed that the activities were not religious, 440 F. Supp. at 1315, but the court found that "the novel aspects of
the case are more apparent than real." Id. at 1320.
77 440 F. Supp. at 1315-16 & n.20. Judge Meanor rejected defendants' approach as misnamed and inappropriate, describing it as "devoid of substantive analysis and plac[ing] determinative emphasis on the [practitioner's] subjective characterization of his activity." Id. at 1317.
Judge Meanor further remarked that the Malnak court was following the usual method of
analyzing the content of the activity in question and the circumstances surrounding it. Id. at
1316-17.
Defendants also termed their analysis a " 'definitional approach,' " claiming that the establishment clause should be more narrowly defined than the free exercise clause, whose broad
scope is needed " 'to protect individual liberty.' " Id. at 1316 & n.20. This is similar to the dual
definition proposed by Professor Tribe of Harvard. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

828 (1978). See Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wisc.
L. REV. 217, 266; note 100 infra.
78 440 F.

Supp. at 1318.

79 Id. at 1319.
80 Id. (quoting Walsh, 398 U.S. at 341).

NOTES

1980]

cases chose an expansive interpretation of religion under a statute, an
area in which the Supreme Court has traditionally been more 81restrained than it has been in construing constitutional provisions.
The district court chose to evaluate the types of practices found
to be religious under Engel, Torcaso, Welsh, and Seeger,82 and to
compare them to the characteristics of the SCI/TM course. 83 This
inquiry resulted in a finding that the theory of the Science of Creative Intelligence as set forth in the textbook was parallel to the common notion of the worship of a deity 84 and that the Sanskrit chant
85
sung at the puja was a prayer, in that it invoked a divine being.
Having determined that SCI/TM was religious in nature, the district court applied the three-pronged Lemon test8a6 in order to ascertain whether an impermissible establishment of religion had taken
place. The first prong, requiring a clearly secular legislative purpose,
was held to have been violated by the method used to achieve that
purpose. Although the secular purpose of offering SCI/TM in New
Jersey's high schools was to avail students of the stress-reduction
benefits of transcendental meditation, 8 7 the court found the teaching
of the religious theory of the Science of Creative Intelligence and the
requirement of attendance at a religious ceremony, the puja, to be
8
unacceptable means to a secular end.
The SCI/TM program was found by the district court to have
offended the second prong of the test, 8 9 as the teaching of the Sci-

ence of Creative Intelligence had the primary effect of advancing religion. 90 The district court further found that the third prong of the
Lemon test had not been satisfied because the course was offered in
the public school curriculum and had received federal funds. 91 This
81 440 F. Supp. at 1314.
82 Id. at 1313-14.
83

See id. at 1320-23; note 76 supra.

84 440 F. Supp. at 1320-22.

85 Id. at 1323-24. The court added a footnote indicating that the compulsion to attend the
puja was more intense than the pressure facing the students in Engel, where only the teacher
was required to repeat the prayer. Id. at n.25. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
88 See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text. Although the district court and the circuit
court in Malnak refer to the three-pronged test as the Nyquist test, it was in fact formulated for

the first time in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
87 440 F. Supp. at 1323; see note I supra.
88 440 F. Supp. at 1324.
89 Id.

Since all three prongs of the test must be satisfied in order for a government activity

to withstand establishment clause scrutiny, the court's analysis could theoretically have stopped
after SCIITM was found to have violated the first part of the test. See text accompanying notes

32-34 supra.
90 440 F. Supp. at 1324.
91 Id. The funds were supplied by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. See
note 2 supra.
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resulted in an excessive entanglement of both state and federal governments in religion. s2
In writing his concurrence in the result for the Third Circuit,
Judge Adams impliedly criticized the per curiam nature of that court's
opinion. He noted that because the facts in Malnak differed considerably from those presented in the Supreme Court cases cited by the
district court, more than a mere -affirmation of-the lower court's opinion was appropriate. In his view, stretching the scope of prior law
93
"calls for both an explanation and a justification."
Judge Adams argued that the school prayer decisions were not
dispositive of the Malnak case, since their facts involved concededly
religious prayers, while the proponents of SCI/TM maintained that
the chant sung during the puja had no religious meaning. 9 4 He
further observed that the other pertinent facts of the SCI/TM case
and the school prayer cases differed so markedly 9 5 that analogizing
the language of the puja to that of the school prayers 96 would not be
fruitful in determining the scope of the meaning of religion under the
97
first amendment as applied to nontheistic faiths.
Agreeing with the district court, Judge Adams found that the
conscientious objector cases of Seeger and Welsh pointed toward a
broader definition of religion under the first amendment 9" as did
Torcaso, which construed the constitution directly. 99 Judge Adams,
like Judge Meanor, favored a unitary approach to defining religion
under the first amendment, and agreed that the broad reading of the
term developed in free exercise cases was properly applied to the
Malnak challenge under the establishment clause. 10 0
440 F. Supp. at 1324.
93 592 F.2d at 200-01 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
9 Id. at 201-03 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
95 Id. The puja was performed away from school property; it did not interfere with school
hours; each student was exposed to the puja only once; an English translation of the chant was
never given the students, so that they probably did not understand the meaning of the Sanskrit
words. Id. at 203 (Adams, J., concurring in the result). Attendance at the puja was mandatory.
Compare note 46 with note 85 supra.
96 592 F.2d at 201-02 & n.7 (Adams, J., concurring in the result). The district court had
used the method of "textual analysis" to compare the puja to the prayers struck down in Engel
and School Dist. v. Schempp. 440 F. Supp. at 1310.
97 592 F.2d at 203 (Adams, J., concurring in the result). Judge Adams characterized the
extent of the constitutional definition of religion as "the important question presented by the
present litigation." Id.
91 See id. at 203-05 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
99 See id. at 205-07 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
100 Id. at 213 (Adams, J., concurring in the result); see Comment, supra note 40, at 339.
Professor Tribe has advocated a dual definition for the religion clauses: "all that is 'arguably
religious' should be considered religious in a free exercise analysis [but] anything 'arguably
non-religious' should not be considered religious in applying the establishment clause." L.
92
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In concurring that SCI/TM was religious in nature, Judge Adams
proposed three guidelines against which a challenged set of ideas
could be measured: 101 1) the nature of the ideas and the extent to
which they address fundamental or "ultimate" questions; 102 2) the
comprehensiveness of the ideas; 103 and 3) whether the ideas contain
any formal components which are analogous to recognized religions. 0 4 When measured by these indicia, the course in SC/TM was
undoubtedly religious. Judge Adams found that the Science of Creative Intelligence treated comprehensively questions of ultimate concern regarding the nature of man and the universe, 10 5 and that the
formality of the puja and the existence of trained teachers whose mission was to spread SCI/TM were analogous to signs commonly associated with religious activities. 10 6
Finally, Judge Adams agreed with the district court's assessment
that the New Jersey SCI/TM course constituted an establishment of
religion because it failed to pass the three-pronged Lemon test. 10 7
He questioned, however, the purported secular purpose behind the
state's involvement, 08 noting that the facts showed "nothing other
than an effort to propagate TM, SCI, and the views of Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi." ' 0 9
By handing down a per curiam opinion affirming the reasoning
and conclusions of the district court, the Third Circuit has left unresolved several questions which arise from the district court's opinion.
Adopting by implication the broad concept of religion articulated in
Seeger, 110 Welsh,"' and Torcaso, 1 12 and rejecting the " 'substantive
TRIBE, supra note 77, at 828 (emphasis in original). Following this approach, the teaching of

SCIrrM under the circumstances in Malnak would not be considered an establishment of religion, although under other circumstances it could be granted protection under the free exercise
clause. Id. See also Galanter, supra note 77, at 265-68; Note, supra note 37, at 1083-86.
101592 F.2d at 208-09 (Adams, J., concurring in the result). Judge Adams pointed out that
these guidelines were not meant to be an absolute test, and stressed flexibility in the consideration of all challenged beliefs. Id. at 210 (Adams, J.,
concurring in the result).
102 Id. at 208 (Adams, J., concurring in the result). Judge Adams considered this element to
be the most important in determining whether or not a set of ideas is religious. Id.
Id. at 209 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
104

Id.

1'5Id. at 213 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
106 Id. at 214 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
107Id.
108 Id.
1ooId. at 215 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
110380 U.S. at 187. Following Seeger, the Malnak court subscribed to the theory that the
concept of ultimacy in a set of beliefs would determine their religious nature, whether or not
they encompassed a belief in a Supreme Being. 440 F. Supp. at 1322; 380 U.S. at 176.
1 398 U.S. at 342-43. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
112 367 U.S. at 495; 440 F. Supp. at 1313. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
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and contextual' " approach to defining religion urged by the defendants,1 1 3 the district court advocated a unitary definition for both religion clauses. 114 Yet Judge Meanor's discussion, in footnote twenty,
of the district court's preference for a single definition of religion to
govern both the free exercise and establishment clauses is unsatisfying. He relied strongly upon Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in
Everson, in which that Justice theorized that since the word religion
is found only once in the first amendment, it must have only one
meaning, equally applicable to both clauses. 115 Judge Meanor modified this rule by stating that the different protections available under
the religion clauses will cause the application of the two clauses to differ. 1 16 He did not consider, however, the ramifications of applying
an expansive Seeger-Welsh concept of religion to establishment clause
cases, which could result in the invalidation of state action in such
traditional governmental spheres as public health, safety, and welfare. 117
The district court dealt with SCI/TM as a single entity, finding it
in violation of the establishment clause due to the religious nature of
SCI and the puja. Thus, the question whether TM, taught without
SCI or the puja, would constitute an establishment of religion if
taught in a public school, remains unanswered." 18
Ambiguity also inheres in the use of a textual analysis to invalidate the puja as an impermissible prayer. As Judge Adams observed
in a footnote, this type of analysis could be used "to invalidate the
pledge of allegiance, the singing of 'America the Beautiful,' or the
performance of certain works from Handel or Bach by a school glee
club."119 Such activities have not been considered prayers under
120
the school prayer case analysis.
See note 75 supra.
114440 F. Supp. at 1316 n.20; see notes 77 & 100 supra and accompanying text.
115 440 F. Supp. at 1316 n.20; 330 U.S. at 32-33 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rutledge
wrote: " 'Religion' appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs two prohibitions
and governs them alike." Id. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
116440 F. Supp. at 1316 n.20.
117 For example, such an application of the Seeger-Welsh analysis could effectively thwart
anti-prostitution and Sunday-closing laws as establishments of religion, since the significance of
such statutes in the eyes of their proponents may be rooted in their moral or ultimate beliefs.
But see, e.g., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermkt., 336 U.S. 617 (1961), decided four years
prior to Seeger, in which Chief Justice Warren wrote that the "purpose or effect" of Massachusetts Sunday-closing laws was not religious and thus did not work an establishment of
religion. Id. at 624, 627-28, 630.
118 The court appeared to note that TM may be taught separately. See 440 F. Supp. at 1324
n.26.
119592 F.2d at 202 n.7 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
120 Id. Judge Adams further remarked that
113

such activities have not been held to violate the establishment clause, even though
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In finding for the first time that a set of ideas is a religion, despite the insistence of secularity by its proponents, 2 1 and'is therefore
violative of the establishment clause, the Malnak decision calls attention to the need for a set of workable standards upon which future
courts may rely in assessing the religious nature of activities under
the first amendment. Such a set of standards need not be in the form
of a concrete definition, which the district court eschewed as too inflexible, 12 2 but could take the form of signposts to guide future courts
in their assessments. In this regard, Judge Adams's concurrence in
the result for the Third Circuit offers an important contribution
toward the development of useful guidelines. 2 3 His proposed
indicia represent a thoughtful distillation of the elements prior courts
have found significant in religion clause analysis, and will undoubtedly prove valuable to later courts grappling with examinations of
those clauses.
The district court opinion in Malnak offers little aid to future
jurists who will deal with religion under the first amendment. Rather
than formulating a coherent guide, the court relied upon its assessment of the "type of activity" found to constitute religion in prior
cases. 1 24 These impressions are not always persuasive, 125 yet they
are the sole legacy of the Malnak decision. In failing to provide an
identifiable-if flexible-guide for future courts faced with similar
challenges, the Malnak court has created as many questions as it has
answered.
Marjorie Gilman Baker

they include references to God or a Supreme Being, because they are undertaken
for patriotic, cultural or other secular reasons, and neither have, nor are intended to
have, a religious effect on those participating in or witnessing them.

Id. See note 96 supra.
121 See notes 12 & 57 supra and accompanying text. Such standards have been suggested by
numerous commentators. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 37, at 341-43; Note, supra note 37,

at 1072-83; Note, supra note 2 at 892-911.
122 Judge Meanor indicated that the Supreme Court had not established such a definition
because of the need for flexibility in dealing with constitutional provisions. 440 F. Supp. at
1312, 1315.
123 See notes 101-06 supra and accompanying text.
124 440 F. Supp. at 1312.
125 For example, the type of state compulsion found in Engel and Schempp was not present
in Malnak. See 592 F.2d at 203 (Adams, J., concurring in the result). See notes 46 & 47 supra.

However, once a student had elected to take the SCIJTM course, he was compelled to attend
the puja. See note 85 supra.

